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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW*
This is a review of important decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota during 1979. The purpose of this
review is to serve as a convenient overview of important decisions
and, in some cases, as a summary of the effect that these decisions
will have on North Dakota law. Not all decisions during this period
are discussed; only those which may have significant impact on
North Dakota law are included.
The review is divided into the following subjects:
Adm inistrative Law ................................. 444
A ttorneys ......................................... 446
Constitutional Law .................................. 447
Criminal Law and Procedure .......................... 448
E ducation ........................................ 454
Family Law ........................................ 456
G overnm ent ...................................... 460
Insurance .......................................... 465
M ines and M inerals ................................. 471
P roperty ......................................... 473
T axation ......................................... 475
Torts ............................................. 479
Uniform Commercial Code ........................... 483
W ills . . . .. .. . .. . . . .. .. . . . . . ... . . .. . ... .. . .. . .. . . . 487
*This project was prepared by the following members of the staff of the North Dakota Law
Review: Doug Boese, Gordon Dihle, Cheryl Ellis, Steven Farhart, Jan Fetsch, Pamela Hermes,
Dennis Edward Johnson,.John Lund. Diane Melbye. Mary Price. and Mark Todd.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The constitutionality of the agricultural exemption under the
Workmen's Compensation Act' was before the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau.2 The Stark County District Court had twice held that the
agricultural exemption violated the North Dakota Constitution and
the United States Constitution.3 The North Dakota Supreme
Court, in a plurality decision, held that the agricultural exemption
violated section 20, article I of the North Dakota Constitution.4 An
addendum to the majority opinion, however, notes that the
concurrence of four members of the court is required to declare a
statute unconstitutional. 5 Thus, "since ... only three members of
the Court concur[red] in . [the] opinion, the agricultural
exclusion from the Workmen's Compensation coverage . . . [was]
not declared unconstitutional by the sufficient majority. "6
The standard utilized by the court to determine whether the
exclusion of agricultural employees from workmen's compensation
coverage violated equal protection was whether there was a "close
correspondence between the statutory exclusion and the legislative
goals to be accomplished by that exclusion. "7 The court noted that,
although the North Dakota Legislature explicitly expressed the
purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, "the exclusion of
agricultural services has no correspondence to that expressed
purpose. "8 The court then outlined four possible purposes for
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted in North Dakota in 1919, 1919 N.D. Sess.
Laws, ch. 162, and is now codified as Title 65 of the North Dakota Century Code. The agricultural
exemption is provided in section 65-01-02(4)(a)(1) of the North Dakota Century Code, and
provides that .'[hazardous employment' shall mean any employment in which one or more
employees are employed regularly in the same business or in or about the establishment except ...
[algricultural or domestic service." N.D. CENT. CODE 5 65-01-02 (4) (a) (1) (Supp. 1979). The Act
covers only "hazardous employment." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (1960).
2. 283 N.W.2d 96 (ND. 1979).
3. Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 97 (N.D.
1979). The first holding was appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota and was remanded to
the district court for a declaratory judgment action. Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 250 N.W.2d 249, 251 (N.D. 1977).
4. 283 N.W.2d at 107. Section 20 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution provides that no
citizen of the state will be granted special privileges or immunities. N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 20.
5. 283 N.W.2d at 108, Addendum. Section 88 of article IV of the North Dakota Constitution
provides that "the supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at
least four members of the court so decide." N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 88.
6. 283 N.W.2d at 108, Addendum.
7. 283 N.W.2d at 99. The court rejected the use of the traditional rational-basis test because the
concerns present in this case (complete exclusion of a legislatively created remedy for personal injury
to one class of employees) more closely resembled concerns addressed in cases using the close-
correspondence test, rather than concerns addressed in cases using the rational-basis test. Id. For
cases applying the close-correspondence test. see Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.
1979): Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978);Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.
1974).
8. 283 N.W.2d at 103. The express purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is found in
section 65-01-01 of the Century Code. N.D. CENT. COoE 5 65-01-01 (1960).
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excluding agricultural employees from workmen's compensation
benefits:
(1) The purpose of excluding agricultural employees was
to overcome political opposition to passage of a
workmen's compensation act by a farm-oriented
legislature.
(2) Farm employees should be excluded because their
work is not as hazardous as other employment and
compulsory coverage for them is not needed.
(3) Farm employees should be excluded because the
"family farm" is a closely knit community of relatives
and friends who care for each other's needs and injuries
and no other protection is needed.
(4) Farm employees should be excluded because the farm
employers cannot afford to pay the premium.9
The court found that the first three purposes provided no
justification for the exemption. 10 The court then considered the
possible economic factors which might provide justification for the
agricultural exemption, and the effect of the exemption upon
agricultural employers and employees. In considering the effect of
the exemption, the court balanced the benefits of the exemption
against the burdens imposed upon agricultural employees and
employers. The court found that the special benefit granted by the
legislature resulted in a burden which rested entirely upon the
injured farm employee," and therefore provided no justification for
the agricultural exemption. The court concluded that "[t]here is no
correspondence between the purpose of the Act and the agricultural
classification. "112
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Sand opined that the plurality
had engaged in legislative lawmaking, and that numerous cases
supported the validity of the agricultural exemption. 13.Justice Sand
concluded that the "entire question is one that should be resolved
by the legislature and not by the court. ",14
9. 283 N.W.2d at 104-05.
I. Id.
11. Id. at 107.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 113 (SandJ., dissenting).
14. Id. at 118 (Sand,.I., dissenting).
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The effect of the court's decision in Benson is that the
agricultural exemption to workmen's compensation coverage is still
valid in North Dakota. The division of the court over the
constitutionality of the exemption, however, may provide the




The North Dakota Supreme Court handed down one
noteworthy decision involving professional ethics of an attorney. In
Matter of Maragos, 16 four letters of informal complaint had been filed
against a member of the North Dakota Bar. After initial
investigations and inquiry proceedings, formal disciplinary
proceedings were instigated. The three-member hearing panel
heard the complaints and determined that Maragos had violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility by misusing client's funds,
failing to keep clients informed on the status of their cases, and
neglecting to take appropriate actions. 7 The hearing panel
recommended that Maragos's certificate of admission to the Bar of
North Dakota be suspended for at least one year and that he pay the
costs of the disciplinary proceedings. 18
The supreme court determined that its scope of review in
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys was to be de novo on the
record, with the standard of proof being clear and convincing
evidence.' 9 The court noted the similarity in disciplinary
proceedings against judges and attorneys, observing that "the aim
of disciplinary proceedings against ajudge is to maintain the honor
and dignity of the judiciary and the proper administration of
justice, ' ' 20 while the aim of a disciplinary proceeding against an
attorney is "to determine, in the public interest, if such attorney
should be permitted to practice law. "121 Thus, the court adopted the
scope of review in disciplinary actions against judges as the proper
scope of review in disciplinary actions against attorneys.
15. The plurality opinion points out that "[tjhe latest edition of IB Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law, § 53:10, indicates that not more than seventeen states have mandatory
workmen's compensation coverage for agricultural workers." 283 N.W.2d at 105.
16. 285 N.W.2d 541 (N.D. 1979).
17. Matter of Maragos. 285 N.W.2d 541, 543-44 (N.D. 1979).
18. Id. at 544.
19. Id. at 546.





In Shaw v. Burleigh County,22 the supreme court addressed the
constitutionality of section 11-1 1-43 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 23  A property owner appealed the board of county
commissioners' denial of his application for extension of a special
use permit to the district court. 24 The district court found that the
board had not abused its discretion and dismissed the appeal.2 5
The district court also determined that section 11-11-43 was an
unconstitutional delegation to the judiciary of non-judicial power to
review legislative acts. 26
On appeal, the supreme court sustained the finding that the
board had not abused its discretion, but upheld the
constitutionality of section 11-11-43.27 The court characterized "de
novo" hearings under section 11-11-43 as "a trial to determine
whether or not the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably. " 28 The court concluded that this construction of the
statute allowed the district court to continue to hear testimony and,
receive exhibits, but not to substitute their judgment for that of the
board. 29 The court recognized, however, that in order for this
construction of the statute to be effective, boards must in the future
disclose the reasons for their decisions. 30
In another decision dealing with constitutional law, State ex rel.
Olson v. Graff,31 the parents of a deceased child applied for
establishment of a medical review panel pursuant to chapter 32-
29.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. 32 After the district court
dismissed the proceedings on the grounds that chapter 32-29.1 was
22. 286 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1979).
23. Shaw v. Burleigh Co., 286 N.W.2d 792. 794 (N.D. 1979). Section 11-11-43 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that "[aIll appeals taken from decisions of a board of countv
commissioners shall be docketed as other causes pending in the district court and shall be heard and
determined de novo." N.D. CENT. COnE .§ 11-11-43 (1976).
24. 286 N.W.2d at 793.
25. Id. at 794.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 797.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 796. It should be noted that the court defined the supreme court's scope of review as
being identical to that of the district court. Id. at 797.
30. Id. at 800.
31. 287 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1979).
32. State ex rel. Olson v. Graff, 287 N.W.2d 87, 88 (N.D. 1979). Secion 32-29.1-03 ofthe North
Dakota Century Code provides that 'ainy person with a claim against a health care provider based
upon alleged professional negligence shall apply to the judge of any court which mav have
jurisdiction over the claim to eslablish a panel according to the provisions of this chapter.'" N.D.
CENT. ConE § 32-29.1-03 (Supp. 1979).
Section 32-29.1-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that "1no action against a
health care provider based upon alleged professional negligence shall be commenced in any court in
this state until the claimant shall file a certificate of review with the court." N.D. CENT. ConF. § 32-
29.1-01 (Supp. 1979).
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unconstitutional, the parents brought an action to have the case
heard directly in district court. 33 The Attorney General of North
Dakota then initiated proceedings in the supreme court to prevent
the district court from considering the complaint, and to have
chapter 32-29.1 declared unconstitutional.
34
The supreme court concluded that it did not have-jurisdiction,
holding that the deceased child's parents, not the attorney general,
were the appropriate parties to challenge the district court's
decision.3 5 The court further noted that chapter 32-29.1 must be
complied with by the courts until its constitutionality is challenged
by an appropriate party. 36 Thus, medical malpractice claims must
still be reviewed by a medical review panel prior to commencement
of an action in district court.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of North Dakota considered several cases
involving criminal law, procedure, and evidence which resulted in
noteworthy decisions.
In State v. Phelps, 37 a unanimous court held that a police search
of a defendant's clothes was unreasonable when the defendant had
not been arrested, despite the clear presence of probable cause. 38 In
affirming the lower court's suppression of evidence obtained in the
search, the court found that certain conditions must be met before
evidence seized without a warrant and not incident to a lawful
arrest will escape the exclusionary rule. 39
The defendant in Phelps had been detained near the scene of a
burglary attempt when surrounding circumstances strongly
supported a suspicion that he had committed the crime. The police
took the defendant into custody but repeatedly told him he was not
under arrest. When the defendant refused to turn over his clothes
and shoes to the police, they were forcibly removed. No warrant
was obtained for the search and the defendant was informed that,
although he was not under arrest, he could not leave the station
until the police received possession of the items.40
The court found that the search did not fit under the
exceptions to the requirement that a search warrant be obtained. 41
33. 287 N.W.2d at 88.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 90.
36. Id.
37. 286 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1979).
38. State v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472, 477 (N.D. 1979).
39. Id. at 475-77.
40. Id. at 476.
41. Id. at 475.
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The exception set out in Chimel v. California,4 2 allowing searches
incident to a lawful arrest, did not apply because there was no
arrest.4 3 The court also found that the exception designated by the
United States Supreme Court in Cupp v. Murphy44 was not
applicable. In Cupp, a defendant was being questioned about the
death of his wife when detectives noticed a substance on his
fingernails that appeared to be blood. When this fact was brought
to the defendant's attention, he placed his hands in his pockets and
apparently attempted to obliterate the evidence. Although the
defendant had not yet been arrested and no warrant had been ob-
tained, the detectives took a fingernail sample in order to prevent
destruction of the evidence. The United States Supreme Court held
that the search was not unreasonable.
45
The court in Phelps noted that Cupp required that three
conditions be met before evidence seized without a warrant and not
incident to a lawful arrest will escape the exclusionary rule: there
must be probable cause to arrest, the search must entail only a very
limited intrusion by the state, and the evidence must be readily
destructible.4 6 The Phelps court found that, although there was
probable cause to arrest the defendant, the intrusion perpetrated by
the police was not a "very limited" one.4 7 Additionally, there was
no "immediate threat" that the evidence would be destroyed
before a lawful arrest could be made or a search warrant
obtained .48
The necessity for specificity in affidavits used to obtain search
warrants was stressed by the court in State v. Schmeets. 49 The
defendant in Schmeets appealed his conviction of possession of a
controlled substance, contending that the trial court should have
suppressed evidence discovered in a search of his home because the
affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued was based on
insufficient probable cause.
50
In Schmeets, a police officer had confronted two juvenile girls
who appeared to be under the influence of drugs. The juveniles told
the police officer that they had obtained drugs at the home of the
defendant, that they had witnessed a drug sale there, and that there
were additional drugs in the defendant's apartment. The police
42. 394 U.S. 752 (1969).
43. 286 N.W.2d at 476.
44. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
45. Cuppv. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973).
46. 286 N.W.2d at 476.
47. Id. at 476-77.
48. Id. at 477.
49. 278 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1979).
50. State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401, 404 (N.D. 1979).
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officer notified a deputy sheriff, who contacted the state's attorney.
The state's attorney prepared the affidavit, and that same evening
went with the deputy sheriff to the home of a judge to obtain a
search warrant.5 1 The judge testified that he had also relied on the
unrecorded, unsworn oral statements of the deputy sheriff and the
state's attorney in issuing the search warrant. 52
The court held that, because rule 41(c) of the North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure 13 requires that statements relied upon
for probable cause to support a search warrant be sworn and
recorded, the oral statements of the deputy sheriff and state's
attorney could not be used as a basis for the issuance of the search
warrant.5 4 The only basis for the search, therefore, was the
affidavit, Which, because it was prepared with information
obtained from an informant, was required to meet the two-pronged
test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v.
Texas. 5
5
51. Id. The search warrant, in relevant part, stated:
That the Harvey Police had picked up to [sic] juveniles near the Harvey Grade school
and that the said girls are under the influence ofdrugs and that thev had obtained the
drugs from a Terry Hager and a Ronnie Schmeets and that they were at the place of'
the above two individuals and thev had stated that concatne Isicl, hashish oil and
Marijuana were at the place of 309 Adams, Ave., Harvey. N.D.
Id. at 40 4- 0 5.
52. Id. at 405.
53. The version of rule 41(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at the
time Schmeets was decided provided:
A warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to or sworn recorded
testimonv taken before a state or federal magistrate and establishing the ground for
issuing the warrant. If the state or federal magistrate is satisfied that grottds for the
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue
a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing with particularity the
person or place to be searched. The finding of probable cause may be based upon
hearsay evidence in whole or in part. Before ruling on a request for a warrant the state
or federal magistrate may require the affiant or other witnesses to appear personally
and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses he may produce, provided
that such proceeding shall be taken down bv a court reporter or recording equipment
and made part of the proceedings. The warrant shall be directed to a peace officer
authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law of this state. It shall command the
officer to search, within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days. the person or
place named for the property specified. The warrant shall be served in the davtime.
unless the issuing authority, Iy appropriate provision in the warrant. and for
reasonable cause shown authorizes its execution at times other than daytime. It shall
designate a state or federal magistrate to whom it shall be returned.
N.D.R. CRiM. P. 41(c). The Supreme Court of North Dakota amended the rule efl'ectis'e.anitary 1.
1980.
54 278 N.W.2d at 405.
55. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The test adopted by theAguilarcourt provides:
ITIhe magistrate must be infbrmed of sonc of the underlying circumistances frotm
whic'h the informant cotichidid that the narcotics wsere wherc he clainied hiev were.
and some of the uinderlsing circumstances from which the officer concluded that the




The two prongs of the Aguilar test are the "basis of
knowledge" prong and the "veracity" prong. 56 To satisfy the first
prong, the magistrate must be informed of sufficient underlying
circumstances to determine that the observations of the informant
were accurate.57 The court emphasized the importance of firsthand
knowledge in satisfying the "basis of knowledge" prong, but also
recognized self-verifying detail as an acceptable alternative. 58 The
''veracity" prong is satisfied by establishing that the informant is
credible or the information reliable. 
59
In criticizing the- affidavit in Schmeets, the court noted that it
did not state that the girls had firsthand knowledge of the
information in the affidavit. 60 Furthermore, the affidavit failed to
"affirmatively state" that the girls had been at the defendant's
apartment; that they had been given drugs at the apartment; that
they were under the influence of drugs; that they had seen other
drugs at the apartment; that they had details of the kinds and
location of the drugs or why they believed them to be illegal; or that
the drugs were still there when they left. 61 The court further stated
that the affidavit should have detailed how the affiant received this
information, including relevant dates and times. 62 Because the
affidavit failed to state that the girls had firsthand knowledge of the
allegations contained therein and there was insufficient detail for
self-verification, the court held that the affidavit did not satisfy the
"basis of knowledge" prong of the Aguilar test, and therefore did
not establish probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant.
63
The court addressed two additional issues in Schmeets64 without
deciding them: 65 the use of admissions against penal interests to
satisfy the "veracity" prong of the Aquilar test, 66 and the
56. 278 N.W.2d at 406.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 407. The "self-verifying detail" concept was adopted in Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969):
In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was
gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity
in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something tmon
substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation Iased
merely on an individual's general reputation.
Id. at 416.
59. 278 N.W.2d at 407.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 407-08.
63. Id at 409.
64. Id. at 409-10.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 409.
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requirement in rule 41(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure 67 that nighttime searches be expressly authorized by an
appropriate provision in the search warrant.
68
In State v. Folk,69 the court held that the number of
impeachment witnesses permitted to testify regarding the character
or reputation of a prosecution witness may be limited by the trial
court. 70 The defendant in Folk based her defense against charges of
selling methamphetamine and marijuana on entrapment. 7' On
appeal, the defendant contended that, because such a defense
focuses on the conduct of law enforcement agents, the limiting of
impeachment witnesses would be an abuse of discretion. 
72
The witness the defendant sought to impeach was a police
informant who, the defendant alleged, had entrapped her. In
reviewing the trial court's refusal to allow the defense to call three
witnesses for the sole purpose of impeaching the informant's
testimony that he had not used, supplied, or sold any drugs to the
defendant, the court held that such testimony may be limited in the
sound discretion of the trial judge. 7 3 The court based its decison on
its duty "to prevent . . . the injection of collateral issues into the
trial of lawsuits.) '74
The standard of review in such a case was held to be whether
the limitation on the number of witnesses was an abuse of
discretion.7 5 No such abuse was found in Folk, because there was
general agreement between the testimony of the defendant and the
informant as to the nature of the persuasion used to induce
commission of the offense. 
7 6
Another issue presented in Folk was whether the trial judge
erred in instructing the jury on entrapment. The defendant
objected to the instruction on the entrapment defense, in which the
term "normally law-abiding persons" was used. 77 The defendant
contended that the language was not clear to lay-jurors, and that a
defendant asserting entrapment in a drug case must usually admit
in open court that he has used drugs, an activity which may
67. See supra note 53.
68. 278 N.W.2d at 409-10.
69. 278 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1979).
70. State v. Folk, 278 N.W.2d 410, 416 (N.D. 1979).
7 1. Id. North Dakota has adopted the ob'jective t st of entrapment, which is met when a law en-
forcement agent induces the commission of an offense through means likely to cause a normally law-
abiding person to commit the offense. Id. at 412. See also State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.
1978).
72. 278 N.W.2d at 416.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ebensen, 38 S.D. 116, 160 N.W. 847 (1916)).
75. 278 N.W.2d at 416.
76. Id. at 417.
77. Id. at 413.
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arguably defeat the "normally law-abiding person" standard. The
court noted that the language of the entrapment statute1 8 refers to
"law-abiding persons," and because that term fairly informs the
jury of the law, omission of the term might be erroneous.7 9 The
court further noted that the defense as currently formulated in
North Dakota might be inadequate in narcotics cases due to the
law-abiding person standard, but indicated that the appropriate
remedy lies with the legislature.
80
In State v. Jensen,81 the defendant appealed his conviction on
two counts of second degree murder, contending that the trial court
had erred in admitting evidence concerning an altercation between
the defendant and another person. Evidence of a fight between the
defendant and another man had been admitted by the trial court,
presumably under rule 405(b) of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence.8 2 Rule 405(b) allows the introduction of specific
instances of conduct in cases in which character or a character trait
is at issue.8 3 Defense counsel asserted that the proper rule to be
applied was rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.8 4
Rule 404 limits the use of character evidence to certain purposes.
The court apparently agreed with defense counsel on this point, 85
holding the evidence of the prior altercation would not have been
admissible under rule 404(b) if the defense had not first brought out
testimony of the altercation in a "light favorable to the defense. "86
The court also emphasized the fact that the defense had been
allowed to introduce character evidence concerning the decedents
and evidence of other crimes and acts of the decedents without first
establishing that the defendant had knowledge of these actions. 87
Because of the exceptional nature of the facts in Jensen, the court
78. Section 12.1-05-11(2) of the North Dakota Century Code provides in part: "Entrapment
occurs when a law enforcement agent induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or
other means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense." N.D. CENT. COrsE
.12.1-05-11(2) (1976).
79. 278 N.W.2d at 414.
80. Id.
81. 282 N.W.2d 55 (N.D. 1979).
82. State v. Jensen, 282 N.W.2d 55, 66 (N.D. 1979). Rule 405(b) provides that "[in cases in
which character or a character trait ofa person is an essential element ofa charge, claim, or defense,
proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct." N.D.R. EvID. 405(b).
83. N.D.R. EviD. 405(b).
84. 282 N.W.2d at 68. Rule 404(b) provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,-or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. However, it may be ad-
missible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
N.D.R. EviD. 404(b).
85. 282 N.W.2d at 68.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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found the case to be an exception to rule 404(b). 88 Stressing that
Jensen is not to be read as varying State v. Stevens,8 9 the court
described its decision as permitting the prosecution to "fight fire
with fire," admitting evidence when the defense had "opened the
door" or under the doctrine of' 'curative admissibility. '90
EDUCATION
In Storbeck v. Oriska School District No. 13,91 plaintiff, a former
superintendent of schools, sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the school board from hiring a new superintendent. The
district court granted the injunction on the ground that the school
board had not given the superintendent proper notice that his
contract would not be renewed. Plaintiff taught one class during the
school year, and contended that he therefore was a teacher within
the purview of section 15-47-38 of the North Dakota Century
Code92 and entitled to notification of contemplated non-renewal of
his contract no later than April 1st. The school board notified
plaintiff on April 14, 1978, that his contract would not be renewed.
The question presented to the court was whether the notice
protections afforded by section 15-47-38 are applicable to a teacher
who is also a superintendent.
The court held that a "superintendent who teaches classes in
88. Id.
89. 238 N.W.2d' 251 (N.D. 1975). The Stevens court stated that "filt is a general rule that
evidence of prior acts or crimes cannot be received unless it is substantially relevant for some purpose
other than to show a probability that a defendant committed a crime charged because he is a man of
criminal character." Id. at 257.
90. 282 N.W.2d at 68.
91. 277 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 1979).
92. Storbeck v. Oriska School Dist. No. 13, 277 N.W.2d 130. 131 (N.D. 1979). Section 15-47-
38(5) of the North Dakota Century Code provides in part:
The school board of any school district contemplating not. renewing a teacher's con-
tract, as provided in section 15-47-27, shall notify such teacher in writing of such con-
templated nonrenewal no later than April first. Such teacher shall be informed in
writing of the time, which shall not be later than April seventh, and place of a special
school board meeting for the purpose of discussing and acting upon such contemplated
nonrenewal. Such teacher shall also be informed in writing of the reasons for such
nonrenewal.
N.D. C ENT. CODE S 15-47-38(5)(Supp. 1977).
"Teacher" is defined in section 15-47-26:
The term "teacher," as used in sections 15-47-27 and 15-47-28, shall be construed to
include all teachers, principals, and superintendents in all public school districts
within this state, and all persons employed in teaching in any state institution, except
institutions of higher education. The term "teacher." as used in section 15-47-38.
shall be construed to include all teachers and principals in all public school districts
within this state, and all persons employed in teaching in any state institution, except
institutions of higher learning.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-26 (Supp. 1977).
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his district is a superintendent, not a teacher, for purposes of § 15-
47-38. 93 The court examined legislative intent to determine that
the superintendent was the "administrative arm" of the school
board, and could redress his grievances more easily than a
teacher.94 Additionally, the court concluded that, because the
school board and superintendent must work closely together, the
board should be entitled to terminate the superintendent's
employment without all of the procedural safeguards afforded
teachers. 95 Thus, the court held that the board had properly
notified the superintendent that his contract would not be
renewed 96
Rolland v. Grand Forks Public School District No. 197 is particularly
noteworthy because it establishes the requisite quantum of proof
necessary before a school board can confirm a contemplated
nonrenewal of a teacher's contract. The court held that, in
confirming a contemplated nonrenewal, the school board, after
complying with section 15-47-38 of the North Dakota Century
Code, need only vote to not renew the contract for the reasons
stated in the notice of contemplated nonrenewal. 9s Thus, there is
no evidentiary burden of proof upon the school board in the
nonrenewal of teachers' contracts.
Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract was also the subject of
litigation in Dobervich v. Central Cass Public School District No. 17.99
Plaintiff sought to restrain the school board from filling his position
with another teacher and to require the school board to issue him a
renewal contract, or, in the alternative, to award him damages. A
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff awarded him $10,000 in
damages, and the school board appealed. The supreme court
reversed and remanded the case.100
The court concluded that in a contract nonrenewal case, as
distinguished from a dismissal or termination, a teacher is not
entitled to ajury trial as a matter of right. 1 1 The court noted that in
nonrenewal cases there are no remedies in contract or tort, and
damages are dependent upon the right to an injunction or
mandamus. 10 2 Furthermore, the function of the trial court is to
93. 277 N.W.2d at 133.
94. Id. at 132.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 135.
97. 279 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1979).
98. Rolland v. Grand Forks Pub. School Dist. No. 1,279 N.W.2d 889, 893 (N.D. 1979).
99. 283 N.W.2d 187 (N.D. 1979).
100. Dobervich v. Central Cass Pub. School Dist. No. 17, 283 N.W.2d 187. 188 (N.D. 1979).
101. Id. at 193.
102. Id. Seealso Baker v. Minot Pub. School Dist. No. 1., 253 N.W.2d 444 (N.D. 1977).
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"review the nonrenewal decision by the Board to determine
whether the procedural steps required by the statute have been
followed and whether, under the facts of the case, a nonrenewal is
authorized."1 0 3 If the nonrenewal is unauthorized, an injunction or
mandamus, with incidental damages, is the appropriate remedy. 104
In Selland v. Fargo Public School District No. 1, 105 the court held
that, despite the school district's mandatory retirement age o f sixty-
five, statutory requirements- of notice and a hearing prior to
issuance of a final board decision not to renew a teacher's contract
must be complied with. 10 6 Thus, the school board must comply
with the provisions of sections 15-47-27 and 15-47-38 of the North
Dakota Century Code 0 7 when a teacher's contract has been
terminated pursuant to a mandatory retirement provision in school
board policy.
FAMILY LAW
The court was presented with a wide range of issues in the area
of family law. Rudelv. Rudel, 108 a case involving division of property
pursuant to a divorce, illustrates the court's reluctance to disturb
the findings of lower courts in property settlements and to lay down
specific rules of law in this area. In Rudel, defendant husband
claimed that the trial court had inequitably divided the marital
estate in the divorce decree. The entire marital estate had been held
in joint tenancy by plaintiff and defendant, and consisted of 290
acres of land which had been purchased on a contract for deed, 160
acres which had been inherited by plaintiff, and 80 acres which had
been inherited by the defendant. The trial court had given the
defendant and plaintiff equal shares of the 290 acres, and had
awarded the 160 acres to plaintiff and the 80 acres to defendant.
Defendant claimed that the trial court had erred because it had
applied a rule of law mandating an equal division of the 290 acres.
The supreme court disagreed, stating that, although defendant was
correct in stating that a trial court is required to make an equitable,
and not necessarily equal, distribution of property, the trial court's
103. 283 N.W.2d at 193. See also Rolland v. Grand Forks Pub. School Dist. No. 1. 279 N.W.2d
889 (N.D. 1979).
104. 283 N.W.2d at 193. See also Baker v. Minot Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 253 N.W.2d 444
(N.D. 1977): Pollock v. McKenzie County Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 221 N.W.2d 521 (N.D.
1974); Henley v. Fingal Pub. School Dist. No. 54, 219 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1974).
105. 285 N.W.2d 567 (N.D. 1979).
106. Selland v. Fargo Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 285 N.W.2d 567. 574-75 (N.D. 1979).
107. N.D. CENT. COOE § 15-47-27 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38 (Supp. 1977).
108. 279 N.W.2d 651 (N.D. 1979).
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decision was not in error because it had in fact applied the correct
rule.10 9 Defendant asserted that the property should have been
divided on the basis of the contribution of each partner, but the
court held that the trial court's decision to divide the property
equally was not clearly erroneous. 10
The court also considered whether the trial court's award of
the inherited property to the party who had inherited it was in
error.1 1' The court held that the lower court's handling of the
inherited property was not erroneous as a matter of law, and that a
court may take inheritance into account in property settlements
and award the property to the party who inherited it. 112
The court finally considered the question of when the interest
on the husband's cash obligations imposed by the divorce -judgment
should commence. The trial court had held that the interest should
commence on the date of trial, rather than on the date of judgment.
The supreme court agreed, noting that the trial court's order that
interest be paid from the date of trial rather than the judgment date
was a permitted method of adjusting the equities of the case. The
court limited its decision, however, stating that it was not
establishing a rule mandating that interest be awarded from the
date of the trial in all circumstances. 
1 13
The court discussed the procedural and substantive rights of
prison inmates in child custody proceedings in In Interest of F.H. 114
A nineteen-year-old unwed mother executed a petition requesting
that the juvenile court terminate her parental rights, as well as
those of the allegqd father, a prison inmate in an Oregon
institution. The juvenile court set a date for the hearing and served
notice upon the husband in Oregon. Because he was in prison, the
alleged father could not appear personally at the hearing, and peti-
tioned the court to postpone the hearing until he could appear to
contest the termination proceedings. The juvenile court denied the
motion for continuance, and at the hearing terminated both
parents' rights. 1 5 The alleged father claimed that the juvenile court
erred in its denial of his motion, contending that the due process
109. Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651, 653 (N.D. 1979).
110. Id. at 655. The court cited two earlier North Dakota cases in which the trial court had
awarded inherited property to the party who had inherited it and divided the balance of the estate
equally. Grant v. Grant, 226 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1975); Bellon v. Bellon, 213 N.W.2d 376 (N.D.
1973).
111. 279 N.W.2d at 654.
112. Id. at 655.
113. Id. at 656.
114. 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1979).
115. In Interest ofF. H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 204-05 (N.D. 1979).
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clause gives a prisoner the right to personally appear in a civil
suit. 116
The North Dakota Supreme Court was persuaded by a line of
state and circuit court cases which hold that an inmate does not
have an unconditional right to appear personally in a civil suit, but
that due process does require that the prisoner be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.117 Elaborating on these cases,
the court reasoned that in civil suits a prisoner may be allowed to
appear personally if his interest in being heard outweighs the costs
and inconveniences to the state.118 The court must balance the
interest of the inmate in presenting his testimony in person rather
than by deposition with the need for an early determination of the
matter, the inconvenience to the state in transporting the prisoner,
and the potential danger of allowing the prisoner to appear. 11 9 The
court affirmed the juvenile court's denial of the motion for
continuance, holding that the husband's opportunity to be heard
could be protected through representation by counsel. 12 0
The alleged father also contended that the juvenile court had
erred in terminating his parental rights. The juvenile court had
based the termination on its finding that the alleged father had
abandoned the child. In discussing whether the parent had
abandoned the child, the court first noted that, pursuant to section
27-20-44 (1) of the North Dakota Century Code, 121 parental rights
may be terminated if it is found that the parent has abandoned the
child. 122 The court stated that abandonment is determined by
examining a number of factors, including whether the parent gives
affection to the child, whether the parent spends time with the
child, and whether the parent provides financial support for the
child's general welfare. 123 The alleged father claimed that the
juvenile court improperly based its abandonment decision on the
fact that he was in prison. 124 The court held that, although the fact
of incarceration is to be considered, it does not per se constitute
abandonment, nor can it be used as a defense to abandonment. 125
The court concluded that, although a parent has a fundamental
116. Id.
117. The court cited the following cases: Moeck v. Zalackowski, 541 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1976);
Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976); Quaglino v.
Quaglino, 88 Cal. App. 3d 542, 152 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1979).
118. 283 N.W.2d at 209.
119. Id. Other factors thrown into the balance are the possibility of delaying trial until the
prisoner is released and the probability that the inmate will be successful on the merits. Id.
120. Id. at 210.
121. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-20-44(l)(1974).
122. 283 N.W.2d at 210.
123. Id. at 213.
124. Id. at 211.
125. Id. at 213.
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natural right to a child, that right is not absolute and must yield to
the welfare of the child. The court found clear and convincing
evidence that the alleged father had abandoned the child. 1
26
Another significant domestic relations case decided by the
court, Mathisen v. Mathisen, 127 involved procedural issues in the
context of a child support dispute. Plaintiff commenced a divorce
action against his wife, requesting that the district court grant
custody of the couple's two minor children to him. Plaintiff failed to
request, however, that his wife pay part of the children's support.
His wife did not respond to the complaint, and the district court
entered a default judgment for plaintiff, granting the divorce and
giving him custody of the children. In addition, the district court
ordered his wife to pay fifty dollars per month child support for the
two children.
The wife appealed, based on rule 54(c) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates that a default judgment
not be different from or exceed the amount prayed for in the
pleadings. 128 Specifically, she alleged that the district court had
violated rule 54 by ordering her to pay child support when the
plaintiff had not requested child support in his complaint. 
129
The supreme court held that the district court had not violated
rule 54, stating that plaintiff's complaint, when considered in light
of section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code, 130 which
authorizes the district court to order child support upon a divorce
decree, gave the wife sufficient notice that the district court might
order her to pay child support. 3' The court therefore reasoned that
the purpose and spirit of rule 54, which functions to apprise a
defendant of the relief which the court might grant upon default,
was not violated by the district court's order. 132 The court's
decision was also influenced by the fact that "there is a strong
public policy that courts have responsibility to assure the proper
support and maintenance of minor children.' 1 33 This policy
apparently made the court reluctant to overturn the district court's
decision.
126. Id. at 214.
127. 276 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1979).
128. Mathisen v. Mathisen, 276 N.W.2d 123, 124-25 (N.D. 1979).
129. Id. at 125.
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971).
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GOVERNMENT
In State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 134 the supreme court exercised
original jurisdiction to consider the issue of the governor's power to
partially veto Senate Bill 2460, and the constitutionality of a
legislative assignment granting the lieutenant governor the position
of federal aid coordinator. The court's well-researched and wisely
reasoned opinion formulates guidelines for the authority of the
governor and legislature in North Dakota.
The purpose of Senate Bill 2460 was to abolish the division of
economic opportunity (a function of the governor's office), and the
state planning commission (a function of the department of
accounts and purchases), by repeal of several sections of the North
Dakota Century Code. 135 On June 15, 1979, Governor Link vetoed
section 1 of Senate Bill 2460, which required that the lieutenant
governor head the federal aid coordinator office created by the
bill. 136
The first issue presented was whether the supreme court had
original jurisdiction to decide the case. The court based its
authority on article IV, section 86 of the North Dakota
Constitution, and section 27-02-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code.1 3 7 The court held that its power to hear cases is discretionary
and cannot be invoked as a matter of right.13 8 The power to
exercise original jurisdiction extends only to cases in which the
question presented is publicijuris (where sovereignty of the state, the
franchises or prerogatives of the state, or the liberties of its people
134. 286 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1979).
135. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-07-06, 54-34.1-01 to -05, -08, -09, -15 (1974) (repealed 1979).
136. State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1979).
137. Article IV, section 86 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The supreme court shall be the highest court of the state. It shall have appellate
jurisdiction, and shall also have original jurisdiction with authority to issue, hear, and
determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary to properly exercise its
jurisdiction.
N.D. CONST. art. IV, S 86.
Section 27-02-04 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in part:
The supreme court may exercise appellate jurisdiction only, except when other-
wise specially provided by law or by the constitution. Such court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, may issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, cer-
tiorari, and injunction. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in its superin-
tending control over inferior courts, it may issue such original and remedial writs as
are necessary to the proper exercise of such jurisdiction. Such court shall exercise its
original jurisdiction only in habeas corpus cases and in such cases of strictly public
concern as involve questions affecting the sovereign rights of this state or its franchises
or privileges.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-02-04 (1974).




are affected), 139 the interest of the state is primary, and the public
has an interest which may be affected. 140 The court ruled that this
case did present an actual controversy of a justiciable character,
and that the exercise of original jurisdiction was warranted. 14
1
The second issue presented was the scope of the governor's
power to partially veto legislation. The governor's power to veto
legislation is set out in article III, section 80 of the North Dakota
Constitution, which provides that "It]he governor shall have power
to disapprove of any item or items or parts of any bill making
appropriations of money or property embracing distinct items."
4 2
Following prior Oklahoma 143 and Idaho 144 decisions, the court
concluded that section 80 of the North Dakota Constitution applies
whenever more than one item of appropriation is made. 
145
The court then considered whether the vetoed section
constituted an item or items, or part or parts, within the meaning
of section 80 of the North Dakota Constitution. Earlier cases
decided in New Mexico, 146 Iowa, 147 Ohio, 148 and Virginia 14 9
expressed the view that the governor may veto items in
appropriation bills if the provisions vetoed are related to the vetoed
appropriation and are so separate and distinct that removing them
does not affect the bill's primary purpose. The North Dakota court
adopted this view, further stating that the governor may not veto
conditions or restrictions on appropriations without vetoing the
appropriation itself. 150 The court held that section 80 of the North
Dakota Constitution did not authorize the governor to veto section
1 of Senate Bill 2460, because that section was not a separate and
distinct provision which could be removed without affecting the
bill's purpose, as the bill which remained would not be workable
legislation. 151 The court held that the attempted partial veto had no
effect, and the bill thus took effect without the governor's approval
139. 286 N.W.2d at 266 (citing State ex tel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914 (N.D. 1978):
Gasser v. Dorgan, 261 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1977); State ex tel. DeKrey v. Peterson, 174 N.W.2d 95
(N.D. 1970)).
140. 286 N.W.2d at 266 (citing State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914 (N.D. 1978):
State v. Omdahl, 138 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1965)).
141. 286 N.W.2d at 267.
142. N.D. CONST. art. III, S 80. It should be noted that article III, section 80, has been proposed
for repeal. The proposed revisions to the section, however, have no bearing on this case.
143. Regents ofState Univ. v. Trapp, 28 Okla. 83, 113 P. 910 (1911).
144. Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 99 Idaho 404, 582 P.2d 1082 (1978).
145. 285 N.w.2d at 268.
146. State ex tel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974).
147. Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1975).
148. State ex rel. Brown v. Ferguson, 32 Ohio St. 2d 245, 291 N.E.2d 434 (1972).
149. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940).
150. 286 N.W.2d at 270.
151. Id.
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because he had failed to take action on the other sections of the
bill. 152
The final issue presented was whether that portion of section 1
of Senate Bill 2460 which assigned the position of federal aid
coordinator to the lieutenant governor was constitutional. The
court, basing its opinion on sections 77 and 83 of the North Dakota
Constitution 15 3 and on an analogous case, 154 found that it was
unconstitutional for the legislature to appoint the lieutenant
governor to the position of federal aid coordinator. The court
concluded that the provision in question was in conflict with an
express provision in the constitution, which states that the governor
shall prescribe the duties of the lieutenant governor. 55 Although
the provision in regard to the lieutenant governor was invalid, the
court further ruled that the remaining provisions of Senate Bill
2460 were valid and currently operative under the direction of the
federal aid coordinator, as appointed by the governor. 156
In McCarney v. Meier, 1 5  the supreme court addressed the
question of the legal validity of signatures on a referendum petition.
The signatures in question were those of persons Who had signed
the petition for referendum of the controversial "Cross Ranch
Bill" (House Bill 1221), but who merely wrote in their home town
as their post office address. The secretary of state ruled that the
petition was insufficient because more was needed than just the
home town, and therefore the measure would not be placed on the
ballot for a vote of the people. This appeal was instituted pursuant
to article 105, section 1 of the North Dakota Constitutional
Amendments as an original proceeding to the supreme court. 15 8
152. Id. at 270-72.
153. Id. at 273. Article III, section 77 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The powers and duties of the lieutenant governor shall be to serve as president of
the senate, and he may, when the senate is equally divided, vote on procedural mat-
ters, and on -substantive matters if his vote would be decisive. Additional duties shall
be prescribed by the governor.
N.D. CONST. art. III, S 77.
Article Il1, section 83 of the North Dakota Constitution provides in part:
The powers and duties of the secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, superintendent of
public instruction, commissioner of insurance, commissioners of railroads, attorney
general and commissioner ofagriculture and labor shall be prescribed by law.
N.D. CONST. art. III, § 83.
154. State v. Douglas, 33 Nev. 82, 110 P. 177 (1910). The Nevada Supreme Court held that the
separation of powers doctrine imposed limitations on the legislature in dealing with constitutional of-
ficers, in that the legislature could not add duties that were foreign to a constitutional office. Id.
155. 286 N.W.2d at 273.
156. Id. at 274.
157. 286 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1979).
158. McCarney v. Meier. 286 N.W.2d 780. 781 (N.D. 1979).
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In formulating its opinion, the court cited State v. Hall'59 for
the proposition that constitutional provisions should be construed
to effect their purpose. Following this reasoning, the court
concluded that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people,
because the purpose of article 105 is to allow the electors final
approval on bills passed by the legislature. 160 The court ruled that
the right of the people to be heard on such measures should not be
defeated on the basis of a petition which was inartfully drawn and
misleading. The court stated that, although the secretary of state
could require a street address, under the present facts the
designation of city and state as a post office address was sufficient
compliance with article 105.161 In support of its decision the court
cited with approval an earlier Oklahoma case. 
162
Justice VandeWalle specially concurred, noting that addresses
written in by the circulator of the petition from a directory were
sufficient identification of the signer, even though the signer did not
write in his address personally. 1
63
Chief.Justice Erickstad dissented, stating that the secretary of
state had not abused his discretion because he had determined that
the addresses of rejected signatures were insufficient because mail
addressed to the given addresses was returned as undeliverable.
164
The Chief Justice further stated that petitioners had failed to follow
instructions to get the proper addresses from the signing electors. 1
65
The dissenting opinion found that the amendment to the North
Dakota Constitution was designed to prevent such a loose
procedure of petition gathering. 1
66
In Caldis v. Board of County Commissioners, 167 the supreme court
faced the task of interpreting section 57-02-27 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which provides in relevant part: "Agricultural
159. 44 N.D. 459, 171 N.W. 213 (1919).
160. N.D. CONST. AMEND. art. 105, § 1.
161. 286 N.W.2d at 787.
162. Id. at 785, citing In re Initiative Petition No. 23, 35 Okla. 49, __ , 127 P. 862, 866 (1912).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted:
The right of direct legislation in the people must be administered by the officers
charged with that duty in such manner as to make it operative. rftechnical restrictive
constructions are placed upon the laws governing the initiation and submission of
these measures, the purpose and policy of the people in establishing the same will be
entirely defeated, and instead of becoming an effective measure for relief from evils.
under which they have heretofore suffered, there will be naught but an empty
shell ....
35 Okla. at - 127 P. at 866.'
163. 286 N.W.2d at 787 (VandeWalle,J., specially concurring).
164. Id. at 790 (Erickstad, C.., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 791-92.
167. 279 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1979).
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lands within the corporate limits of a city, whether or not platted,
shall constitute agricultural property and be so classified and valued
for ad valorem property tax purposes until such lands are put to
another use. ",168 Three issues were presented, the major one being
whether section 57-02-27 of the North Dakota Century Code, as
amended in 1973, retroactively applied to agricultural lands
annexed to a city prior to 1973. The supreme court found that
under article XI, section 176 of the North Dakota Constitution,
taxes must be uniform upon the same class of property. 169 The
court ruled that to place properties used for the same purpose in
different classes and assess them at different rates would abrogate
the North Dakota constitutional requirement of uniformity. The
court held that section 57-02-27 must be construed both
retroactively and prospectively. The court also concluded that all
land within a taxing district used for agricultural purposes should,
be included in one class, and, regardless of the date of annexation,
should be uniformly assessed. 
170
A second issue presented was whether section 57-02-27
violates the North Dakota and United States constitutional
guarantees of equal protection by removing assessment power from
local authorities and assessing agricultural lands in urban areas by
the standards set for assessment in surrounding rural areas. The
court cited with approval a Minnesota case, Elwell v. County of
Henneuin, 171 which upheld a Minnesota statute similar to section 57-
02-27, and rejected a Nevada case, Boyne v. State, 172 which had
invalidated a similar statute. The court concluded that the North
Dakota statute had a valid legislative purpose and thus did not
violate equal protection under either the North Dakota
Constitution or the United States Constitution. 173
168. N.D. C ENT. CODE § 57-02-27 (1979).
169. Article XI, section 176 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property including franchises within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. The legislature may by law exempt
any or all classes of personal property from taxation and within the meaning of this
section, fixtures, buildings and improvements of every character, whatsoever, upon
land shall be deemed personal property. The property of the United States and of the
state, county and municipal corporations and property used exclusively for schools.
religious, cemetery, charitable or other public purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
Except as restricted by this Article, the legislature may provide for raising revenue and
fixing the situs of all property for the purpose of taxation. Provided that all taxes and
exemptions in force when this amendment is adopted shall remain in force until other-
wise provided by statute.
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 176.
170. Caldis v. Board ofCountv Comm'rs, 279 N.W.2d 665, 669-70 (N.D. 1979).
171. 301 Minn. 63. 221 NW.2d ,538 (1974).
172.80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964).
173. 279 N.W.2d at 670-71.
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Finally, the court considered whether section 57-02-27
violates section 179 of the North Dakota Constitution, which
grants assessment power to the local assessor in the manner
prescribed by law. 174 The City and County argued that section 57-
02-27 removed the power of assessment from local assessors by
requiring a uniform assessment based on the value fixed by
adjoining townships on agricultural land. After defining
''assess, ''175 the court concluded that actual assessment power
remains with local assessors, and article XI, section 179 of the
Constitution was not offended by the statute in question. 
176
INSURANCE
In Weber v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 177 the
court discussed the extent of coverage provided by the North
Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act, 178 commonly known as the
no-fault insurance act. The case involved an action by a surviving
spouse for death benefits under a no-fault insurance policy. 179 The
decedent in Weber had been killed while sitting in the driver's seat of
his vehicle when a hunting companion's gun discharged. 180 The
issue in the case was whether the surviving spouse was entitled to
death benefits based upon section 26-41-07 of the North Dakota
174. Article XI, section 179 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
All taxable property except as hereinafter in this section provided, shall be assessed in
the county, city, township, village or district in which it is situated, in the manner
prescribed by law. The property, including franchises of all railroads operated in this
state, and of all express companies, freight line companies, dining car companies.
sleeping car companies, car equipment companies, or private car line companies,
telegraph or telephone companies, the property of any person, firm or corporation
used for the purpose of furnishing electric light, heat or power, or in distributing the
same for public use, and the property ofany other corporation, firm or individual now
or hereafter operating in this state, and used directly or indirectly in the carrying of
persons, property or messages, shall be assessed by the State Board of Equalization in
a manner prescribed by such state board or commission as may be provided by law.
But should any railroad allow any portion of its railway to be used for any purpose
other than the operation of a railroad thereon, such portion of its railway, while so
used shall be assessed in a manner provided for the assessment of other real property.
N.D. CONST. art. XI, S 179.
175. 279 N.W.2d at 672. The court adopted the following definition of'assess".
The word 'assess' has a well-defined meaning when used in connection with the
taxation of property. It means to make a valuation and appraisal of property, usually
in connection with a listing of property liable to taxation. . . .The word 'assess' im-
plies the exercise of discretion on the part of officials charged with the duty of
assessing, including the listing or inventorying of the property involved. the deter-
mination of the extent of the physical property, and the placing ofa value thereon.
279 N.W.2d at 672 (citing Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Weeks, 8 F. Supp. 935 (D.N.D. 1934)).
176. 279 N.W.2d at 672-73.
177. 284 N.W.2d 299 (N.D. 1979).
178. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26-41 (1978).
179. Weberv. State Farm Mut. Ins, Co., 284 N.W.2d 299. 300 (N.D. 1979).
180. Id.
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Century Code.'"I This section requires no-fault insurers to pay
benefits for economic loss resulting from bodily injury sustained by
the owner of a motor vehicle "while occupying any motor
vehicle.' 182
The court in Weber found that the hunter was "occupying the
vehicle" within the meaning of the statute, 183 and affirmed the
district court's ruling which allowed the decedent's widow to collect
no-fault benefits. 84 In construing the no-fault statute, the court
stated that "though the legislature may not have contemplated this
particular type of accident, a fair reading of the terms used would
indicate they would have provided for coverage had they
considered it. "185
The court in Weber commented on Norgaard v. Nodak Mutual
Insurance Co., 18 6 a North Dakota case involving an automobile
and a fatal gunshot wound, which was decided before the adoption
of the no-fault statute. The rule adopted in Norgaard, requiring a
causal connection between the accident and the operation,
maintenance, and use of the automobile, was distinguished in
Weber. 187 The court relied upon the factual differences between the
two cases, 8 8 but noted that Norgaard "was decided at a time when
fault determinations were essential to the establishment of
liability." 8 9 The court in Weber also found Norgaard distinguishable
because it involved the interpretation of the scope of coverage
under a particular insurance policy, while Weber required the
interpretation of the North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations
Act. 190
The effect of the court's holding in Weber is to make no-fault
automobile coverage in North Dakota available to one occupying
an insured vehicle, regardless of the instrumentality which causes
the injury. This makes coverage under North Dakota's no-fault
insurance statute significantly broader than that provided in other
jurisdictions. 191
The intent of the North Dakota Legislature in enacting the
181. Id.
182. N.D. CENT. CODE S 26-41-07 (1978).
183. N.D. C ENT. CODE ch. 26-41 (1978).
184. 284 N.W.2d at 303.
185. Id. at 302.
186. 201 N.W.2d871 (N.D. 1972).




191. See, e.g., O'Key v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.. 89 Mich. App. 526, 280 N.W.2d 583 (1979).
The court in Weber noted that its decision appeared to be inconsistent with the O'Key decision. The
court, however, distinguished O'Key, noting that O'Key applied the causal connection test in a no-
fault setting, which the Webercourt refused to do. 284 N.W.2d at 302.
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North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act' 92 was also at issue
in St. Alexius Hospital v. Eckert. 193 In St. Alexius, an insured who was
injured in an automobile accident incurred a total economic loss in
excess of his no-fault policy limits. 194 He therefore directed his no-
fault insurer to pay no-fault benefits to him for wages lost and to
withhold payment of the hospital bill. 195 As a result the hospital
sued the insured to recover the cost of the medical services it had
provided.196 The insured then initiated a third-party action against
Blue Cross of North Dakota, with whom he had a hospital-service
contract, asking that any judgment against him be deemed a
judgment against Blue Cross. 197 Blue Cross, in turn, brought a
third-party complaint against the insured's no-fault insurance
carrier, claiming that the no-fault insurer was primarily responsible
for payment of the hospital bill. 198
The central issue in St. Alexius was "whether a person injured
in an automobile accident may require that his no-fault benefits be
applied to wage loss and allocate his medical expenses to medical
insurance coverage where the person's total economic loss exceeds
his no-fault insurance policy limits.' ' 199 The North Dakota Auto
Accident Reparations Act allows for the coordination of benefits
payable by an insurer, other than a basic no-fault insurer, with
benefits payable under a basic no-fault policy.2 00 In St. Alexius, how-
ever, the court found the coordination of benefits provision to be
ambiguous. 20 1 In construing the provision, the court noted that the
purpose of the Act was to "provide adequate compensation for the
insured party. "02 Thus, the court concluded that the legislature's
intent in enacting the coordination of benefits provision was to
prevent double recovery of benefits, not to preclude an insured
from allocating his losses among different insurers where the total
economic loss exceeds the no-fault benefits. 20 3 The court noted that
"[t]he insured is the one who has paid premiums, and he should be
allowed to take advantage of the coverage he paid for and be able to
stack or allocate his insurance policies to meet his needs. "204
192. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26-41 (1978).
193. 284 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1979).




198. Id. at 444.
199. Id.
200. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 26-41-10(3) (1975). This section was amended by the North Dakota
legislature in 1977. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 26-41-10(3) (1978).
201. 284 N.W.2d at 445.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 446.
204. Id.
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Blue Cross had a coordination of benefits clause in their
insurance policy that required benefits payable under the Blue
Cross policy be reduced by the amount payable under a no-fault
automobile policy. 20 5 This clause, however, did not conform with
the statutory requirement found to exist in St. Alexius. The court
stated that "the non-conforming language of the policyclause must
be impliedly replaced with conforming language stating that Blue
Cross benefits are reduced by the amount of basic no-fault benefits
paid, not merely payable. ' 20 6 The North Dakota statute allowing
an insurance carrier to coordinate the benefits it is obligated to pay
with basic no-fault coverage has since been amended. 20 7 The
amended portion of the section establishes a five thousand dollar
limit on the amount of benefits which may be coordinated. 20 8 The
effect of this amendment, coupled with the court's decision in St.
Alexius, is summarized in a footnote from that decision: "Thus a
person suffering economic loss because of an automobile accident
occurring after the effective date of the 1977 amendment will be
required to collect the first five thousand dollars of economic-loss
benefits from his no-fault insurer before making claim on an
additional insurer. "209
What might prove to be the most important aspect of the St.
Alexius case is dicta concerning the stacking of no-fault policies. The
court discussed an earlier Minnesota case 210 which allowed an
iniured person to recover loss benefits to the extent of the stacked
policy limits. The court indicated that the same might be possible in
North Dakota, since North Dakota, like Minnesota, has no law
clearly prohibiting stacking of insurance policies. 2 1'
In Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Insurance
Co., 21 2 an insured sued its insurer seeking recovery of an
embezzlement loss. The court considered several issues on appeal,
including when the loss had occurred under the fidelity loss policy,
whether the insurer had acted in bad faith in denying part of the
liability for the insured's claim, and whether punitive damages
should have been awarded based upon the wrongful conduct of the
insurer.2 13 The insurance policy at issue in Corwin did not define
205. Id. at 444-45.
206. Id. at 446.
207. 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 253, 1.
208. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-10(3)(1978).
209. 284 N.W.2d at 445 n.2,
210. Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co.. 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1978).
211. 284 N.W.2d at 446. The court also discussed an Oregon case. Monaco v. United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co.. 275 Or. 183. 550 P.2d 422 (1976), in which stacking was not allowed
because Oregon had a specific statute clearly preventing the recovery.
212. 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979).
213. Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth v. \'estchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638. 641 (N.D.
1979).
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the time at which a "loss" through employee embezzlement
occurred, and the court therefore found the term to be
ambiguous. 2 14 The insurer argued that the embezzlement loss
occurred when the embezzling employee, in an attempt to conceal
the wrongdoing, diverted funds from a proper account to another
account - a process known as "lapping. "215 The court, however,
rejected this argument, noting that it was required to construe the
ambiguity in favor of the insured. 216 The court applied the majority
rule, 2t7 which states "that a default occurs when the initial
misconduct is committed, and not at subsequent times when the
employee takes steps to cover up his initial misconduct. "218 Thus,
the court affirmed the district court's ruling that the insurer was
liable for the embezzlement loss.
2
19
The adoption of the majority rule in Corwin is consistent with
the economic realities that exist in such a situation. The minority
position advocated by the insurer in Corwin implies that, by
diverting money from one account to another to conceal an earlier
embezzlement, an employee in some way reimburses the employer
for the initial embezzlement loss. 22 0 Reimbursing an employer with
other money later embezzled from him, however, cannot erase the
fact that the employer has suffered a loss continuing from the time
of the initial embezzlement.
The court in Corwin also considered whether the district court
had erred in finding that the insurer had acted in bad faith by
partially denying liability for the plaintiffs claim. 221 Relying
heavily upon two California cases, 222 the court held "that in North
Dakota an insurer is obligated to act in good faith in its relationship
with its policyholders. ' ' 223 The court went on to state that "[ain
insurer's breach of this duty may subject it to liability for damages
to the insured proximately caused thereby. "224 Noting that the
214. The court cited a number of North Dakota cases, including Hughes v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975). 279 N.W.2d at 642. The court, however. went on to
note: Were the parties to this appeal two insurance companies, rather than an insured and its in-
surance company, Westchester's argument might be more persuasive." Id. at 642 n.2.
215. 279 N.W.2d at 641.
216. Id. at 642.
217. Id. at 641.
218. Id. at 641-42. The court cited sections 46:184 and 46:185 of Couch on Insurance 2d, for a
delineation of the two views. G. COUGH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 5§ 46:184, 185 (2d ed. R.
Anderson 1965 & Supp. 1979).
219. 279 N.W.2d at 642.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973);
Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975).
223. 279 N.W.2d at 643.
224. Id.
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issue of bad faith was a question for the trier of fact, the court
affirmed the district court's finding of bad faith because it was not
clearly erroneous.
2 2 5
The final issue considered in Corwin was whether the district
court had erred in refusing to award exemplary damages. 226 The
court stated that the duty of an insurer to act in good faith in
discharging its contractual obligations is imposed by law, and does
not arise out of the terms of an insurance contract. 227 The court
further noted that "in a proper case, an insurance company found
to have acted in bad faith could be required to pay punitive
damages to its insured. ' 228 In determining whether exemplary
damages were appropriate under the applicable North Dakota
statute, 22 9 the court in Corwin relied upon case law230 construing a
similar California statute. 231 The court affirmed the district court's
denial of punitive damages, finding that "the insured had failed to
show that the insurer acted with the intent necessary to justify an
award of exemplary damages. "232
Sierra Life Insurance Co. v. Wigen233 involved an appeal by a
foreign life insurance company from an order of the North Dakota
Commissioner of Insurance suspending the company's certificate
of authority to do business in North Dakota. On appeal, the order
was affirmed by the Burleigh County District Court 234 and the
North Dakota Supreme Court.
235
The controversy in Sierra arose when the commissioner of
insurance had, as required by statute, 236 suspended Sierra's
certificate after concluding that Sierra was in an "unsound
condition. ' 237 This conclusion was based, in part, upon the
commissioner's determination that certain assets held by Sierra
could not be held by an insurance company under North Dakota
law.2 38 As a result of this determination, those assets not properly
held by Sierra were not considered in the evaluation of its financial
condition .239
225. Id. at 644.
226. Id. at 645.
227. Id. (citing Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973)).
228. 279 N.W.2d at 645.
229. N.D. CENT. COoE 5 32-03-07 (1977).
230. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711
(1974).
231. CAL. CtV. CODE 5 3294 (West 1970).
232. 279 N.W.2d at 646.
233. 286 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1979).
234. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Wigen, 286 N.W.2d 296, 299 (N.D. 1979).
235. Id.
236. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-07-14 (1977).
237. 286 N.W.2d at 301.




The conclusion that Sierra's financial condition was unsound
was also based upon a finding that Sierra had improperly valued
other assets. 240 The supreme court rejected Sierra's argument that
"under North Dakota law the insurance commissioner must accept
the determinations of a foreign company's state of incorporation as
to which assets were admissible and as to the value of its assets. "241
The court concluded that it was proper for the commissioner to use
the provisions governing investments of a domestic insurance
company as "guidelines for determining the soundness of the
financial condition of Sierra. 2-42 The court in Sierra reached this
conclusion even though the North Dakota laws controlling foreign
insurance companies do not indicate the specific types of
investments that are proper for a foreign insurance company.
243
As a result of the ruling in Sierra, an insurance company
incorporated in another state must comply with the investment
requirements imposed upon domestic insurance companies. 244 If a
foreign insurance company does not comply with North Dakota
law, its certificate will be subject to revocation by the North Dakota
Commissioner of Insurance, regardless of the fact that the
insurance company may be considered financially sound within the
meaning of the laws of the state of its incorporation.2 45 This implies
that an insurance company which the commission finds to be
financially unsound under applicable North Dakota law will not be
able to obtain a certificate of authority to do business in North
Dakota. In this regard, the court stated that an insurance company
need not be insolvent to be in an "unsound condition.' ,246
The court's decision in Sierra potentially benefits North Dakota
consumers. At least in theory, it should prevent the sale of
insurance policies by companies which might not be financially
capable of paying benefits under those policies.
MINES & MINERALS
In Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 247 the court attempted to define the
extent to which a lessee under an oil and gas lease may use the




243. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26-09 (1975).
244. 286 N.W.2d at 302.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 312.
247. 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979).
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mining activities. In 1977, plaintiffs obtained the oil and gas rights
to defendant's property in Williams County. Under the leases
granting the oil and gas interests, plaintiffs were required to
compensate defendant for any harm done to his property as a result
of their mining activities. Plaintiffs wanted to conduct seismic
explorations on defendant's property immediately, but he claimed
that such seismic exploration would greatly damage his property,
and that as a result he would be entitled to compensation under the
lease for this damage. 248 When the parties could not agree on the
amount of compensation, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the
district court seeking a permanent injunction restraining defendant
from interfering with their rights under the lease.
249
The court, in affirming the district court's grant of a
permanent injunction, stated that under the usual oil and gas lease
the lessee is entitled to make such use of the land as is reasonably
necessary to explore, develop, and transport minerals, 250 but the
lessee must also give due regard to the lessor-landowner's rights.
251
In interpreting what constitutes a "reasonably necessary use," the
court adopted the test used by the Supreme Court of Texas in Getty
Oil Co. v. Jones.252 The Getty test, known as the "accommodation
doctrine," requires, before the owner can successfully prevent the
lessee from pursuing its initial proposal for mineral development,
that the lessor-owner first show that there are reasonable
alternatives available to the lessee which will accomplish the lessee's
purposes while preserving the surface owner's property. The
North Dakota court emphasized that if no reasonable alternative
methods of development are available the lessee will be entitled to
pursue his initial proposal, regardless of the damage to the owner's
property.2 53 The court did state, however, that once reasonable
alternatives are found "the concepts of due regard and reasonable
necessity do require a weighing of the different alternatives against
the inconveniences to the surface owner. "254
The court focused much of its attention upon clarifying the
concept of reasonable alternative use. It explained that the
reasonableness of any alternative method of mineral development
248. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (N.D. 1979). Kerbaugh complained
that the oil company's seismic explorations would cause damage to his grain crop, pasture, and other
farmland. Kerbaugh was also concerned about the disruptive effect the company's preliminary
exploration was having on his water supply. Id.
249. Id. at 134.
250. Id. at 135. In using this "reasonably necessary use" test, the court was following the
general rule it had earlier set out in Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 834 (N.D. 1969).
251. 283 N.W.2d at 135.
252. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
253. 283 N.W.2d at 136.
254. Id. at 137.
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depends upon the usual and customary practices of the mining
industry, and also upon the character of the land involved. 255 If the
lessor-landowner objects to the lessee's proposed method of mineral
development and proposes an alternative which involves a method
of mineral development customarily used by the oil and gas
industry on lands similar to that of the lessor, then that particular
alternative will probably be deemed reasonable. In Hunt, because
the defendant failed to present evidence of a reasonable alternative
to plaintiffs' proposed seismic exploration, the court affirmed the
district court's grant of the permanent injunction.
256
PROPERTY
In Schnaible v. City of Bismarck, 25 7 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the owner of a dry-cleaning business, who had
removed equipment from his building subsequent to condemnation
by the state, was entitled to compensation for removal of such
equipment even though such compensation was ordinarily
awarded only if the equipment remained on the premises. 2- 8 The
court also held that the owner could be compensated under both a
state statute governing payments in lieu of relocation cost in
connection with removed property, 259 and under the state con-
stitutional provision providing for eminent domain
compensation. 260
Plaintiff's dry-cleaning operation was located on leased
premises which were condemned for a Bismarck improvement
project. He accepted $6,012 compensation, pursuant to the North
Dakota Model Relocation Assistance Act, 26 1 designated as
"[cjonsideration for 'in lieu' payment for moving personal
property, storage and the disconnection and reconnecting of all
appliances associated with this dry cleaning business. "262 Plaintiff
sought additional compensation for the decrease in value of his
equipment resulting from the condemnation proceeding. 263 A
partial summary judgment awarded by the district court was
reversed by the supreme court, and the case was remanded. 264
255. Id. at 136. This test was part of the accomodation test delineated by the Texas court in
Getty.
256. Id. at 139-40.
257. 275 N.W.2d 859 (N.D. 1979).
258. Schnaible v. City of Bismarck, 275 N.W.2d 859, 868-69 (N.D. 1979).
259. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE S 54-01.1-03 (1974).
260. 275 N.W.2d at 868-69; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14.
261. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 54-01.1 (1974 & Supp. 1979).
262. 275 N.W.2d at 863.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 869.
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The court first considered whether the equipment removed by
the plaintiff constituted trade fixtures. The court adopted three
general factors to consider in making this determination, as set out
by the Michigan Supreme Court:265 "First, annexation to the
realty, either actual or constructive; second, adaptation or
application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to
which it is connected is appropriated; and, third, intention to make
the article a permanent accession to the freehold. "266
Under North Dakota law, the condemnor cannot treat the
equipment as personalty, as can a landlord, but must treat the
trade fixtures as realty, for which the condemnor must make just
compensation if the fixtures are taken or damaged. 267 The court
rejected the position, adopted in some states, that the tenant makes
a final election to have his trade fixtures treated as personal
property, and hence not compensable, by his decision to remove or
leave the items.
268
The court weighed heavily the fact that Highway Department
personnel had informed the plaintiff that his equipment was
personal property for which he would receive no compensation if
left on the condemned premises. 269 The court decided that plaintiff
had acted under a practical compulsion when he removed the
fixtures. 270 The court further would not allow the State to avoid
compensating the plaintiff simply because he had been represented
by counsel.
271
One key to the decision was the court's emphasis on the state
constitutional provision which specifies that owners of property
shall receive just compensation for property "taken or damaged,"
and not just for property "taken," as is common in the constitu-
tions of many eastern states. 272 Allowing compensation for fixtures
removed from condemned premises' would fall under the
"damaged" language of the constitution. 273
265. Id. at 864. The test was adopted from Morris v. Alexander, 208 Mich. 387, 390, 175 N.W.
264, 265 (1919).
266. 208 Mich. at 390, 175 N.W. at 265.
267. 275 N.W.2d at 864. Generally, once a person affixes his property to the realty of another
without an agreement permitting him to remove it, the fixture belongs to the owner of the realty. The
exception under section 47-06-04 of the North Dakota Century Code, however, states that a tenant
may remove trade fixtures during the continuation of the lease if such removal can be accomplished
without injury to the leased premises. This exception exists only for the benefit of the tenant and does
not inure to the benefit of the condemnor. Id.; N.D. CENT. CoDE S 47-06-04 (1978).
268. 275 N.W.2d at 865. The court pointed out that this put the tenant on the horns of a
dilemma. If he removes the fixtures he knows they will be classified as personalty with no
compensation for loss in value. If he leaves the fixtures behind he runs the risk that they will be found




272. 275 N.W.2d at 865; N.D. CONST. art. I, S 14.
273. 275 N.W.2d at 866-69.
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The court discussed at length whether the plaintiff's
acceptance of a relocation payment under section 54-01.1-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code constituted a waiver of his right to
compensation in an eminent domain proceeding. The State
claimed that allowance of compensation in both eminent domain
proceedings and under section 54-01.1-03 would be double
compensation. 2 74 The measure of'damages in eminent domain
proceedings is the difference between the value of the fixtures in
place and as severed from the realty. 275 Removal costs were found
not to be includable in eminent domain compensation because they
constitute neither an element of the taking nor of the damage, and
because such damages could vary greatly with the whim of the
owner in determining where to move. 27 6 North Dakota law does,
however, provide for relocation costs or payments in lieu thereof. 277
The court held that there is no prohibition in the statute to prevent
compensation for removal of damaged property when there has
already been compensation for the damage. 2 78
The "in lieu" language of section 54-01.1-03(3) refers to
payment made when a business cannot be relocated without a
substantial loss of patronage.2 79 To conclude that the propertyowner
cannot remove his property after accepting an "in lieu" payment
under that section would result in a taking of property without
payment. 280 The court concluded that the plaintiff did not waive
compensation under the constitutional provision merely because he
had accepted payment under section 54-01.1-03, because the
compensation under the statute was for a separate and distinct
injury. 281
TAXATION
In Soo Line Railroad Co. v. State,282 the supreme court
determined questions regarding 1974-1976 property tax
assessments levied by the State Board of Equalization against Soo
Line Railroad property in North Dakota. The plaintiff Soo Line
Railroad appealed a district court decision upholding the property
tax assessments against its property. Plaintiff contended that the
274. Id. at 867.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 868.
277. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE 5 54-01.1-03 (1974).
278. 275 N.W.2d at 868.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 869.
282. 286 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1979).
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railroad industry had become economically unfeasible and was in a
state of obsolescence, and that the State Board of Equalization used
a grossly erroneous and inadequate capitalization rate, as well as
inadequate and arbitrary obsolescence adjustments, in calculating
the tax assessments.
283
Section 57-05-11 of the North Dakota Century Code2 84 and
article XI, section 179 of the North Dakota Constitution, 28 5 both in
effect during the years in question, require the board of
equalization to annually assess at actual value the operating
property of each railroad within North Dakota. Plaintiff took issue
with the determination of railroad system value and the use of
different percentages of assessed value to compute taxable value for
different categories of taxpayers*286
Before deciding the major issues, the court concluded that the
State Board of Equalization was an "administrative agency" under
283. Soo Line Railroad Co. v. State, 286 N.W.2d 459, 461-63 (N.D. 1979).
284. Section 57-05-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, which was effective at the time the
1974, 1975, and 1976 assesments were made, provided:
The state board of equalization, at its annual meeting in August in each year, shall
assess at its actual value, the operating property, including franchises, except that if
any railroad allows any portion of its railway to be used for any purpose other than the
operation of a railroad thereon, such portion of its railway while so used shall be
assessed in a manner provided for the assessment of other real property, of each
railroad operated in this state, including any electric or other street or interurban
railway. To enable said board to make a correct valuation of such property, it shall
have access to all reports, estimates, and surveys of a line of railroad on file in the office
of the public service commission and shall have power to summon and compel the
attendance of witnesses, and to examine such witnesses under oath in any matter
relating to the value of such property. In fixing the value of any such railroad, and of
the branches and sidetracks thereof, the board shall be governed by the rules
prescribed for county and township assessors in valuing other property in this state.
The board shall make a record of the value placed by it upon the property of the
railroad, including the valuation per mile of main line and of branch lines and
sidetracks.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-05-01 (1972). This section was amended by the North Dakota legislature in
1979. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-05-01 (Supp. 1979).
285. Article XI, section 179 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
All taxable property except as hereinafter in this section provided, shall be
assessed in the county, city, township, village or district in which it is situated, in the
manner prescribed by law. The property, including franchises of all railroads operated
in this state, and of all express companies, freight line companies, dining car
companies, sleeping car companies, car equipment companies, or private car line
companies, telegraph or telephone companies, the property of any person, firm or
corporation used for the purpose of furnishing electric light, heat or power, or in
distributing the same for public use, and the property of any other corporation, firm or
individual now or hereafter operating in this state, and used directly or indirectly in
the carrying of persons, property or messages, shall be assessed by the State Board of
Equalization in a manner prescribed by such state board or commission as may be
provided by law. But should any railroad allow any portion of its railway to be used for
any purpose other than the operation of a railroad thereon, such portion of its railway.
while so used shall be assessed in a manner provided for the assessment of other real
property.
N.D. CONST. art. XI, 5 179.
286. 286 N.W.2d at 462.
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North Dakota law, 287 and that the proper standard of review on
appeal was a "preponderance of the evidence," as required by
section 28-32-19 of the North Dakota Century Code.
288
The court reversed the district court opinion, concluding that
the use of a seven percent capitalization rate in determining the
capitalized income valuation of a railroad was unrealistic and
improper. The court directed the equalization board to apply a
capitalization rate which reflected the rate of return a reasonable
investor would expect from an investment. 28 9 The court further
concluded that the use of a higher percentage of assessed value for
centrally assessed property than that which is used for locally
assessed property is impermissible under section 176 of the North
Dakota Constitution. 290  The court further noted that the
equalization board had conceded that de facto classification of
property exists in North Dakota, and ordered that these de facto
classifications of property be ended for purposes of taxation. The
court, however, applied this ruling wholly prospectively, to begin
in 1980, to avoid the hardship of revising county budgets for prior
years.291
Justice Sand specially concurred in part and dissented in part.
Justice Sand dissented on the basis of the prospective application of
the rule eliminating de facto classifications, stating that, although
appellant won on points of law, appellant would yet be denied relief
because of the prospective application of the decision.
292
On rehearing, the court extended the effective date of
application of the ruling eliminating de facto classifications for tax
purposes to 1981.293
In City of Fargo v. Cass County, 294 the supreme court reversed a
decision by the district court which had granted a writ of
mandamus ordering Cass County to pay to the City of Fargo all
monies in the bridge fund, or which may come in to the bridge
fund,
which may have been or which shall be levied, assessed
and collected from persons and property, or either, within
287. N.D. CENT. CoDE §28-32-01 (1) (Supp. 1979).
288. 286 N.W.2d at 463.
289. Id.
290. Id. Article XL, section 176 of the North Dakota Constitution provides in part: "Tax shall
be uniform upon the same class of property including franchises within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax." N.D. CoNsr. art. XI, § 176.
291. 286 N.W.2d at 465.
292. Id. at 467.
293. Id. at 468.
294. 286 N.W.2d 494 (N.D. 1979).
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the city of Fargo until such time as the city of Fargo's
share of the costs of the bridges which are being
constructed at First Avenue North and Twelfth Avenue
North, or either of said bridges; has been paid in full from
such tax and the city's other revenues used to finance
such bridge or bridges.
295
The district court relied heavily upon section 24-08-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code as a basis for granting the writ. 296 Cass
County on appeal contended that the statute had been impliedly
repealed and was unconstitutionally vague, and that the district
court had misconstrued the phrase "bridge fund."
297
The supreme court analyzed the legislative history of the
statute and examined succeeding statutes. The supreme court
found that when chapter 318 of the 1923 Session Laws was enacted,
it in effect rendered what is now section 24-08-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code inoperative by eliminating the bridge tax
which supplied money for the bridge fund. 298 After further analysis
of related statutes, the court concluded that, if there was now to be
a bridge fund, such a fund would have to be funded at the
discretion of the county commissioners .299
The court stated that the city and county each has only such
authority as is granted to it or is necessarily implied from the
grant. 30 0 They both derive their authority from the same source
and are of equal standing. Consequently, neither may impose its
wishes upon the other without express constitutional or legislative
authority. 30 1 The court felt that if the writ obtained by the city was
sustained, it would be tantamount to holding that the county is
subordinate to the city, and that the city may dictate when the
county must create and budget a bridge fund. 30 2 The court
concluded that a writ of mandamus may be used to compel
295. City of Fargo v. Cass County, 286 N.W.2d 494, 495 (N.D. 1979).
296. Section 24-08-08 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as follows:
The county treasurer of each county wherein any city shall have constructed a
bridge, or hereafter shall construct a bridge, over any navigable stream, shall pay to
the auditor of such city whereby such bridge has been constructed or is about to be
constructed, all money in the county treasury or which may come into the county
treasury in the bridge fund of such county, which may have been or which shall be
levied, assessed, and collected from persons and property, or either, in said city.
N.D. CENT. CoDE § 24-08-08 (1978).
297. 286 N.W.2d at 495.
298. Id. at 498.
299. Id. at 498-99.




performance of an act which is a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station if the applicant can show the existence of a legal
right to the performance sought. 30 3 This, however, does not include
a discretionary act of an official. 30 4 Because the court found no
statute which expressly or impliedly directed county commissioners
to turn over bridge funds to cities, the court ruled that the trial
court inappropriately issued the writ of mandamus. 30 5 The case was
remanded with directions to vacate the writ of mandamus. 
306
TORTS
In Wirth v. Mayrath Industries -Inc., 30 7 the court considered
questions involving strict liability in tort. The case demonstrates
that issues of strict liability inherently involve broad social and
economic policy aspects as well as legal considerations. 30 8 The
plaintiff, Linda Wirth, brought a wrongful death action against
Cavalier Rural Electric Cooperative (REC) and Mayrath
Industries for the death of her husband, alleging that defendants
were strictly liable in tort under sections 402A and 519 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 30 9 At the time of Mr. Wirth's
death, REC was maintaining a power line which crossed part of the
Wirth farmstead. Mr. Wirth was killed when a grain auger he was
moving came in contact with the power line.
310
Plaintiff's first claim was that defendants were strictly liable
under section 402A, which states generally that one who sells a
defective product which is unreasonably dangerous is liable for
physical harm caused thereby, regardless of whether the seller ex-
ercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
product. 311 REC contended that section 402A did not apply in this
case because there had been no sale, as required by section 402A,
between REC and plaintiff.312 Rather, REC contended that it had
303. Id. at 500-01 (citing Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Paulson, 239 N.W.2d 842 (N.D, 1976))-
304. 286 N.W.2d at 501 (citing Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Paulson, 239 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1976);
First Bank & Trust Go. v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1972).
305. 286 N.W.2d at 501.
306. Id.
307. 278 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1979).
308. Prosser has noted that in situations in which the plaintiff has resorted to a strict liabilitv
theory, the defendant's conduct has usually not fallen within the traditional realm of negligence.
Prosser reasons that, because neither side is blameworthy, strict liability is invoked in the namnc of
social justice so that the loss may be shifted to the parts' ihat can best hear it. In many cases, scwici%
as a whole must bear the burden of the faultless accident. W. PRossERn, LAW OF TORTS 494 (4th cd.
1971).
309. Wirth v. Mayrath Indust. Inc., 278 N.W.2d 789, 790 (N.D. 1979).
310. Id.
311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS . 402A (1976).
312. 278 N.W.2d at 791. The district court had agreed with defendant, holding that strict
liahili tv did not apply to injuries and damages from contact with high tension power lines owned Ieb
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merely rendered services to plaintiff, and thus section 402A did not
apply. The court disagreed, citing cases which held that the
distinction between a sale and the rendition of services is a highly
artificial one for purposes of section 402A strict liability.
313
Nevertheless, the court held that section 402A strict liability could
not be imposed upon the defendant, because there were no
defective services rendered by REC.
314
Plaintiff also argued that strict liability should be imposed
upon REC because it would be able to spread the economic cost of
the death among its 1,800 members. The court answered plaintiff's
argument by adopting the rationale of Ferguson v. Northern States
Power Co.,3 15 a 1976 Minnesota case factually similar to Wirth. 31 6
The Minnesota court had held that, although plaintiff's risk-
spreading argument was persuasive, a rule imposing strict liability
on small electric utilities for maintaining power lines causing injury
to customers would be a great economic burden to the power
companies. The Minnesota court refused to adopt the rule as a
matter of law, stating that the question was one of economic policy
appropriate only for the legislature to decide.3 17 The North Dakota
court in Wirth agreed with the Minnesota court's reasoning, and
declined to hold REC strictly liable as a matter of law.
318
In addition, plaintiff contended that REC was strictly liable
under section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
holds those conducting abnormally dangerous activities strictly
liable for injuries caused by such activities. The court held that
REC's activity of maintaining power lines was not an abnormally
dangerous activity.3 19 The court emphasized that, in order to be
considered abnormally dangerous, the activity in question must not
only be very dangerous, but must also be unusual and
infrequent.3 20 In addition, the court implied that if defendant's
utilities. The district court cited two cases which had held that, before a plaintiff could successfully
impose strict liability on a utility company, there must be a sale between the plaintiff and the
company. See Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975); Kemp v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1970).
313. 278 N.W.2d at 791. Counsel for plaintiffcited the following cases for the proposition that.
for strict liability purposes, the sale/services distinction is obsolete: Johnson v. Sears. Roebuck &
Co.. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973): Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.. 54 N.J. 585. 258 A.2d 697
(1969).
314. 278 N.W.2d at 792-93.
315. 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190(1976).
316. Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co.. 307 Minn. 26. 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976). In
Feriuson, suit was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by a young boy when a falling
branch caught on defendant's transmission line while the boy was trimming trees in his backyard. Id.
at 27. 239 N.W.2d at 191.
317. Id. at 32. 239 N.W.2d at 193-94.
318. 278 N.W.2d at 793.
319. Id. at 793-94.
320. Id. The court cited a federal district court case and a Restatement Comment to establish
480
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activity is essential to the welfare of the community the court will be
reluctant to declare the activity abnormally dangerous. 3 1 Thus, the
court held that maintaining power lines was not an abnormally
dangerous activity.
The court in Herman v. Magnuson3 2 2 decided two principal
issues, one involving the constitutionality of section 40-42-02 of the
North Dakota Century Code, and the other dealing with the
common-law family car doctrine. The case arose when a truck
driven by Eric Magnuson collided with a vehicle in which plaintiff
was riding. Plaintiff brought a negligence action against defendants
Terrance Magnuson (Eric's father) and the City of Grand Forks.
Plaintiff based his action against Terrance Magnuson, who was not
in the vehicle at the time of the accident, on the family car doctrine.
In addition, plaintiff alleged that the City of Grand Forks had been
negligent in designing the road on which the accident occurred.
As defendant, the City of Grand Forks answered plaintiff's
complaint by claiming that plaintiff had not complied with the
applicable statute, 323 section 40-42-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which requires a plaintiff who intends to sue a city in tort for
negligent maintenance and design of streets to file notice with the
city auditor within ninety days from the time of the injury.
Admitting that he had not complied with section 40-42-02, plaintiff
nevertheless claimed that the statute should not bar his action
because it violated equal protection.
324
Plaintiff argued that the statute violated equal protection
because no notice was required between private tortfeasors, while
such notice was mandatory when the government was the
tortfeasor. 325 Applying a standard of review which it termed
"intermediate scrutiny," which requires a "close correspondence"
between legislative means and ends, the court held that the statute
did not violate the equal protection clause. 32 6 The court ultimately
this proposition. See Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cd. 1976):
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, Comment f (1976).
321. 278 N.W.2d at 794. Although the court concluded that sections 519 and 52(0 of thc
Restatement (Second) of Torts were inapplicable to the case, the court's statement about the
beneficial aspect of defendant's activity to the ComImunity seems grounded in section 520(0 as ;I
factor to weigh in determining whether defendant's activity is abnormally dangerous. Id. That
subsection states that one of the factors used to determine whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous is the "extent to which Ithe activity's valie to the conmunitv is out weighed Iy its
dangerous attributes." RESTATEMFENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 520(f)(1977).
322. 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1979).
323. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (1979). Sections 40-42-01, 40-42-02. and 40-42-03
of the North Dakota Century Code were repealed in 1977. 1977 N.D. Sess. laws ch. 303. § 18. The
injury to plaintiff occurred in 1975-, while these sections were still in effect. Thi new law is codified in
chapter 32-12.1 ofthe North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. Coot th. 32-12.1 (Supp. 1979).
324. 277 N.W.2d at 450.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 451, 454. The court rejected strict scrutiny as a standard of review because there
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seemed to focus on the importance of the statute's purpose in
resolving the constitutional question, concluding that the statute
enabled the city to investigate the merits of the claim and to adjust
claims without the expense of litigation. The court indicated that
the legislature could properly provide this protection to cities. 327 It
should be noted, however, that the legislature in 1977 repealed
sections 40-42-01, 40-42-02, and 40-42-03 of the North Dakota
Century Code.
328
In discussing the family car doctrine, the court noted that a
plaintiff is required to establish two elements. First, he must show
that the head of the household furnished the vehicle for the use of
the driver involved in the accident. Second, the plaintiff must prove
that the driver involved in the accident was a member of the
furnisher's family. 329 Defendant Terrance Magnuson claimed that
the "furnishing element" had not been satisfied, because Eric
Magnuson (defendant's son) had legal title to the vehicle involved
in the accident. 330  The court disagreed with defendant's
contention, noting that legal title is only one factor to be considered
in determining whether the defendant had "furnished" the
vehicle. 33 1 The court listed several other factors to be considered:
who paid for the car, who controlled the use of the car, who paid the
car's maintenance and gas expenses, and who was intended by the
parties to be the true owner. The court, noting that defendant had
paid his son's gas expenses and had given his son an interest-free
loan to purchase the car, held that defendant had furnished the
vehicle for his son's use.
332
As to the second element of the family car doctrine, which
requires that plaintiff show the driver to be a member of the
furnisher's family, the court again resorted to a totality of the
circumstances approach. The court stated that, although the fact
that the driver maintains a residence separate from the furnisher is
an important factor to be considered in determining whether the
family-member element is satisfied, it is not determinative. 3
33
Other factors to be considered include whether the driver is
had been no fundamental right asserted by plaintiff, and because the statute created no suspect
classification. The court also rejected the rational basis test, because the plaintiff's right of action in
this case had been created by the common law rather than the legislature. This apparently obviated
the need to defer to the legislature. Id. at 451.
327. Id. at 454.
328. See supra note 323.
329. 277 N.W.2d at 461.
330. Id. at 456.
331. Id. at 458.
332. Id. at 459. See Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz. App. 476. 441 P.2d 73 (1968); Calhoun v.
Eaves, 114 Ga. App. 756, 152 S.E.2d 805 (1966).
333. Id. at 460.
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financially independent and whether the driver spends a great deal
of time at the furnisher's home. 334 The court held that, because
Eric was financially independent and maintained a separate
residence, he was not a "family member" for purposes of the
family car doctrine. Therefore, the doctrine could not be applied to
hold defendant liable for his son's negligence.
3 5
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In Gimble v. Kuntz, 336 a buyer of a farm tractor brought an
action to revoke and rescind a purchase agreement, on the ground
that the tractor was unfit for the purpose for which it had been
purchased, pulling a large round baler. The tractor first broke
down with transmission problems after approximately two hours of
use. 337 Following repairs, the tractor was again rendered inoperable
with transmission problems after approximately twenty additional
hours of use.3 38 The buyer notified the seller that he no longer
wanted the tractor, and filed an action for rescission pursuant to
section 51-07-07 of the North Dakota Century Code.
3 39
In reversing the district court's judgment for the seller, the
court found that the issues of whether there was timely notice of
rescission and whether the tractor was reasonably fit for the
purpose for which it was purchased were questions of fact.3 40 The
court further found that under section 51-07-07 of the North
Dakota Century Code the purchaser of a tractor has a reasonable
time after delivery to inspect and test the tractor to determine if it is
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was purchased. 34 1 The
court construed the phrase "reasonably fit for the purpose for
which it was purchased" to mean that the tractor "is free of serious
defects which would render it inoperable, and that, under ordinary
and reasonable operating conditions, the tractor will perform as
intended and expected." 342 The court further stated that the test of
rescission was not how the tractor operated when in good operating
condition between breakdowns, but how it performed throughout
the entire testing period. 343 The buyer in this case did not have to
334. Id.
335. Id. at 461.
336. 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979),
337. Gimbel v. Kuntz, 286 N.W.2d 501. 503 (N.D. 1979).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 504.
340. Id. at 506.
341. Id. at 507.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 508.
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rely on any express or implied warranties granted by the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), because section 51-07-07 expressly
affords the buyer more protection than that provided under the
U.C.C. provisions.
3 44
In Martin v. Melland's Inc., 345 the buyer of a truck and attached
haystack mover, on which a trade-in allowance was given, brought
suit against the seller, a farm implement dealer. At issue was which
party should bear the loss of the trade-in unit, which was destroyed
by fire while in the buyer's possession but after the certificate of
title had been delivered to the seller. The district court, relying on
section 41-02-46(2) of the North Dakota Century Code, 346 found
that at the time of the unit's destruction the buyer was the owner,
and thus dismissed the action. 347 Although the supreme court
affirmed the lower court's dismissal, it concluded that section 41-
02-46(2) did not apply to this case. 348 Instead, the court affirmed
the judgment on the grounds that the risk of loss had not passed to
the seller pursuant to section 41-02-57 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 349 The court recognized that the concept of title, while not
entirely inapplicable, is of decreased importance under the
U.C.C.350 The court further found that a trade-in was a sale, and
therefore subject to the provisions of the U.C.C.
351
Under section 41-02-57, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
upon his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant. If the seller
is not a merchant, the risk passes to the buyer on tender of
delivery. 352 Because plaintiff conceded that he was not a merchant,
it was necessary for the court to determine if he had tendered
delivery of the trade-in unit to the defendant pursuant to North
Dakota law. 353 The court held that the trade-in unit had clearly not
been tendered to the defendant, because the parties had agreed that
the plaintiff would keep the old unit "until they had the new one
ready. "354 Because there was no tender of delivery, the plaintiff had
to bear the loss.
3 55
In Production Credit Association qf Minot v. Melland, 356 plaintiff, a
344. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. Coor § 41-02-02 (1968)). The court was impliedlv relirring to
scctions 2-313. 2-314. and 2-315 ofthe Uniform Conn oerial Code. Se' ,ito U.C.C. § 2-102.
345. 283 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1979).
346. Section 41-02-46(2) is North Dakota's codification of'section 2-401 of the U.CC.
347. Martin v. Melland's Inc.. 283 N.W.2d 76. 77 (N.D. 1979).
348. Id. at 78.
349. Id. Section 41-02-57 is North Dakota's codification ofsection 2-509 ofthe U .CC.
350. 283 N.W.2d at 79-80.
351. Id. at 81.
352. Id. at 82.
353. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-51(l) (1968).
354. 283 N.W.2d at 82.
355. Id. at 83.
356. 278 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1979).
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secured creditor, brought suit against a debtor and other creditors
to recover proceeds from the sale of a mortgaged crop. In affirming
the district court's judgment for the secured creditor, the supreme
court found that a transaction in which a farmer gave a growing
crop as collateral for a loan had effect as security rather than as a
sale. 357 In Melland, the first creditor, who had advanced money to
the debtor prior to the plaintiff's loan, had not perfected his interest
pursuant to the U.C.C.358 Therefore, the court held that the
plaintiff was not barred from asserting its priority under a filed
financing statement pursuant to section 41-09-33 of the North
Dakota Century Code,3 59 notwithstanding plaintiff's knowledge of
a previous security interest or his lack of good faith.3 60 The court
found nothing in the record to indicate any showing of bad faith,
nor was it established that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
prior security interest.3 61 The court also held that the plaintiff, who
had a security interest in the mortgaged crop, was properly
permitted to reach the proceeds of the crop, which were in the
possession of another creditor who had not perfected his interest.
362
The court reasoned that, under the U.C.C., proceeds do not have
to be received by the debtor. 363
In Dangerfield v. Markel,364 the court affirmed the district
court's award of damages to a buyer for breach of a sales contract
by defendant, a potato grower. 365 The buyer took thirty-eight days
after the date of breach to "cover" the potato contract during a
period of rising market prices.3 66 The court ruled that, because the
goods were bulky and perishable, and because the post-breach
market conditions hampered immediate cover purchases, the buyer
had made a reasonable purchase in good faith without
unreasonable delay. Therefore, the "cover" was properly made
under the U.C.C. 367 The court also concluded that the defendant
had not met his burden of proving that cover was improperly
357. Production Credit Ass'n ofMinot v. Melland, 278 N.W.2d 780, 786 (N.D, 1979).
358. Id. at 784.
359. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 41-09-33 (Supp. 1979) [U.C.C. § 9-3121.
360. 278 N.W.2d at 786.
361. Id. at 785.
362. Id. at 788-89.
363. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-27 (Supp. 1979) [U.C.C. § 9-3061.
364. 278 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1979).
365. Dangerfield v. Markel, 278 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1979). This case has been before the North
Dakota Supreme Court on two prior occasions. In Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373 (N D.
1974), the court considered the application of the Statute of Frauds and a number of pro(-dural
matters. In Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 1977). the court held that Markei )ad
breached the agreement between the parties, thus entitling Dangerfield to damages.
366. 278 N.W.2d at 367.
367. Id. at 368-69. Section 41-02-91(1 ) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by making in
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obtained or that the district court's findings were clearly
erroneous. 368 Therefore, the buyer was allowed to recover the
difference between the cost of the substitute goods and the contract
price. 369 The court, however, did not allow the buyer to recover
consequential damages, stating that cover had been effected and
that no authority existed to allow consequential damages under
these circumstances.
3 70
The court also decided a case under the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), Town and Country Co-op v. Lang.371 A dispute arose between
the parties as to the assessment of monthly finance charges on a
consumer credit account held by the defendant debtor. 372 The
defendant appealed from an adverse judgment by the district court,
alleging that the plaintiff was violating the disclosure requirements
of the Truth in Lending Act and that the compounding of finance
charges on his account was improper because his account was not
an "open-end credit" account. 3 73 The court found that under
Regulation Z of the TILA "open-end credit" means "credit
extended pursuant to a plan providing for and contemplating
continuing or repetitive transactions on credit. '374 The court
pointed out that the defendant was permitted to make credit
purchases from time to time on his account, and that the plaintiff's
credit policy permitted the defendant to pay his outstanding
balance either in full or in installments.3 75 Furthermore, the
plaintiff computed a one percent finance charge on defendant's
outstanding unpaid balance at the end of each month. 376 Therefore,
the court concluded that the account was an open-end credit
arrangement within the meaning of the TILA definition. 37 7 The
court further justified its decision by finding that the defendant had
been informed of the plaintiff's credit policy at the time of the
account's inception and by defendant's monthy billing statements,
which specified each month's charges, payments, and credits. 378
Thus, in upholding the lower court's decision, the court held that
good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.
N.D. CENT. COOE % 41-02-91(l) (1968) IU.C.C. § 2-712(l)].
368. 278 N.W.2d at 370.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 372.
371. 286 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 1979).
372. Town and Country Co-op v. Lang, 286 N.W.2d 482, 483 (N.D. 1979).
373. Id. at 486.
374. Id. at 487. SeeTruth in Lending Act. 12 C.F.R. 226.1-.15 (1980).
375. 286 N.W.2d at 487-88.





the discosure requirements of the TILA for open-end credit plans
had been met, and that the Act was not violated by the
compounding of finance charges. 7 9
WILLS
In Kuhn v. Kuhn, °80 the supreme court held that, although a
1952 family agreement signed by the parents and four of their five
children did not constitute a valid and mutual will of the parents,
3 8'
it did constitute a legally binding contract to dispose of property
3 82
which was properly enforced through specific performance.
38 3
The father had died in 1953. All of his property was held in
joint tenancy with right of survivorship with his wife, and passed to
her on his death. In 1953, she executed deeds conveying the
property in accordance with the terms and provisions of the family
agreement. Those deeds remained in her safety deposit box and
were never delivered or recorded prior to her death in 1977. In
1961 and 1968 she executed wills which, if recognized, would
change the distribution from that established in the 1952
agreement .
3 84
One of the sons, as third-party beneficiary, brought suit,
alleging that the family agreement was a valid joint and mutual will
which had not been revoked prior to his father's death. 385 On
appeal, the court considered whether the agreement constituted a
valid will, and, if not, whether the agreement constituted a valid
contract to devise or bequeath property.3 8 6 The supreme court held
that the family agreement was not a valid will because it was not
executed in accordance with the then-existing wills statute.3 87 The
court did hold, however, that the mutual promises of the parents to
dispose of their property jointly constituted sufficient consideration
to render the agreement valid as a contract.38 8 The court also
adopted the position, held in Michigan3 8 9 and Wisconsin,3 90 that
equity will enforce specific performance of such an agreement if,
379. Id.
380. 281 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1979).
381. Kuhn v. Kuhn, 281 N.W.2d 230, 233 (N.D. 1979).
382. Id. at 236.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 231-32.
385. Id. at 232.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 233. In violation of the then-existing wills statute, the parents never declaced to
attesting witnesses that the agreement was their will, and the children who signed the agreement
were listed as parties and not as attesting witnesses.
388. Id. at 236.
389. See Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930).
390. See Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924).
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after the death of one of the parties, the other party accepts the
benefits of the agreement.
39
1
The court, noting a similar Illinois case, 392 found that the
agreement in Kuhn reflected an intent to pool the property into a
joint fund followed by.joint disposal of that fund. 393 This operated
as a waiver by the survivor of the right to dispose of the property as
she otherwise saw fit. 394 The court found that the acceptance of
benefits under the agreement made it irrevocable, and decreed that
the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the
agreement. 395 Because none of the four remaining children had
brought a similar breach of contract action, they were limited to
their shares under the probated will. 196
391. 281 N.W.2d at 234. Although the cases considered dealt with situations in which oral
contracts were made between husband and wife to execute mutual or reciprocal wills, the court here
found an easier situation because the contract was written and no question as to its content arose. Id.
392. Bonczkowski v. Kucharski. 13 111. 2d 443. 150 N.E.2d 144(1958).
393. 281 N.W.2d at 234-35.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 236.
396. Id.
488
